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OPINION OF THE COURT 
               
 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 This case arises under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-85. 
Appellees Ned and Diane Drinker brought the case individually, 
and as parents and next friends of their son, Daniel, against the 
appellants Colonial School District and certain of its officials, 
seeking a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to keep 
Daniel at Gladwyne Elementary School in the Lower Merion School 
District.0  As a matter of convenience we will refer to 
appellants collectively as "Colonial."  The district court had 
jurisdiction under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(A), and 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343.  We have jurisdiction over the appeal from 
the district court's final order dated February 13, 1995, 
granting in part and denying in part the Drinkers' motion for a 
preliminary injunction and entering judgment in favor of the 
                     
0Daniel and his parents also sued the Superintendent of the 
Colonial School District, the Director of Pupil Services, and the 
members of the school board. 
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Drinkers on Count II of their complaint, since the district 
court's order terminated the litigation in that court.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  We will affirm the district court's order, and remand 
the case for the entry of orders in accordance with our opinion.  
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Daniel Drinker,0 a ten-year-old child born with Down's 
Syndrome and cerebral palsy, has received special education and 
related services since he was an infant.  Since the summer of 
1992, Daniel's family has resided in the Colonial School 
District.  Colonial first evaluated Daniel for special education 
services that summer and, consistent with that evaluation, 
prepared an individual education program (IEP) for Daniel with 
the help of his parents on October 21, 1992.  At that time, 
Colonial placed Daniel in a full-time learning support class at 
the Gladwyne Elementary School in the neighboring Lower Merion 
School District because Colonial lacked the means to educate 
Daniel in its own schools.  It cost roughly $25,000 per year to 
send Daniel to Gladwyne. 
 In 1993, Colonial developed a special education program 
in its own schools into which it wished to place Daniel. 
Accordingly, on July 30, 1993, Colonial issued a Notice of 
Recommended Assignment (NORA) to Daniel's parents indicating that 
it intended to move Daniel to a full-time learning support class 
                     
0We normally would not publish the name of a child involved in 
IDEA proceedings.  However, because the district court did so in 
its published opinion, we see no utility in our own redaction. 
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at Whitemarsh Elementary, a school within the Colonial District 
in September 1993.0  The Drinkers protested the change and 
invoked their hearing rights under the IDEA.0  20 U.S.C. 
§1415(b)(2).  Dr. Carroll Redfern, a Pennsylvania impartial 
hearing officer, conducted a hearing on the issue on November 1, 
1993.  In his decision, Dr. Redfern concluded that Colonial could 
change Daniel's placement to Whitemarsh Elementary School, but 
                     
0As noted in Drinkers' brief, Colonial violated Daniel's rights 
under the IDEA by unilaterally altering Daniel's NORA. Br. at 14 
n.10.  The state appeals panel noted as much in its March 17, 
1994 opinion: 
 
[T]he district, by unilaterally altering 
Daniel's NORA and, by implication, his IEP, 
has lost an opportunity to treat Daniel's 
change in schools as anything other than a 
change in placement.  We advise the district 
that the hearing officer erred in finding 
that no procedural violations occurred.  The 
district may not alter, unilaterally, an 
agreed upon NORA or IEP . . . . 
 
App. at 13.  We note the issue here merely as part of our summary 
of facts, as it has not been raised for our review. 
0Under the Pennsylvania regulations implementing the IDEA, 
parents may request an impartial due process hearing 
 
concerning the identification, evaluation or 
educational placement of, or the provision of 
a free appropriate public education to, a 
student who is exceptional or who is thought 
to be exceptional or a young child who is 
eligible or who is thought to be eligible, if 
the parents disagree with the school 
district's identification, evaluation or 
placement of, or the provision of a free 
appropriate public education to, the student 
or young child. 
 
22 Pa. Code § 14.64 (1993); see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.504, 
300.506 (1995).  Under the Pennsylvania regulations, Daniel 
qualifies for special education as an "exceptional student."  See 
22 Pa. Code §§ 14.1, 342.1. 
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not until the beginning of the 1994-1995 school year and not 
until it completed a transition plan.  Colonial thought the delay 
recommended by Dr. Redfern before Daniel's transition to 
Whitemarsh was too long and appealed the decision to the state 
education agency.  The Drinkers did not appeal the decision of 
Dr. Redfern.0 
 On March 17, 1994, a three-judge administrative appeals 
panel issued an opinion agreeing with Colonial that Dr. Redfern's 
                     
0There is some dispute as to why the Drinkers did not appeal the 
hearing officer's decision that Colonial could proceed with the 
placement change in Daniel's program.  In their brief, the 
Drinkers state that the hearing officer "ordered the parents and 
the District to use the spring semester to prepare a transition 
plan for Daniel to move into a Colonial School District site in 
the fall."  Br. at 5 (citing Hearing Officer Decision, App. at 
11).  Apparently, the suggestion here is that Dr. Redfern did not 
specifically order placement at Whitemarsh, but only placement at 
a school within the Colonial District: 
 
Despite the characterization of Whitemarsh as 
the stay put placement by the second appeals 
panel, . . . Dr. Redfern's order never 
mentioned Whitemarsh Elementary as an 
appropriate placement for Daniel; rather, he 
ordered the parents and the District to meet 
`for the purpose of preparing a transitional 
plan for Daniel to enter CSD [the District] 
[in] the fall semester of 1994.' 
 
Id. at 5 n.3 (quoting App. at 11). 
 
 The Drinkers further state that they "did not object to 
Dr. Redfern's order, because, as they testified, they have never 
objected to an appropriate in-district placement."  Id. at 5. 
Thus, the parents seem to suggest that, had they realized that 
the hearing officer's order would require placement specifically 
at Whitemarsh Elementary, they would have appealed the order to 
the first appeals panel. 
  
 For the purposes of this appeal, we need not determine 
why the Drinkers did not appeal the placement decision of Dr. 
Redfern.  Their decision not to appeal, however, has contributed 
to a procedurally complex series of IDEA disputes. 
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recommended delay before transition was too long and holding 
that: (1) the parties were to develop a transition plan by April 
1, 1994; (2) Daniel could remain at Gladwyne through April 22, 
1994; and (3) the parties could move Daniel to Whitemarsh on 
April 25, 1994, where Colonial would continue to implement his 
transition plan. 
 The parties did not develop Daniel's transition plan in 
accordance with the appeals panel's schedule because the Drinkers 
refused to cooperate with Colonial.0  On April 25, 1994, Colonial 
stopped paying for Daniel's education at Gladwyne. Drinker v. 
Colonial Sch. Dist., 888 F. Supp. 674, 676 (E.D. Pa. 1995).0 
Nevertheless, Daniel remained at the school.  The Drinkers paid 
$6,000 to Gladwyne for Daniel's education before exhausting their 
resources.
0
 
                     
0At the district court hearing held on February 3, 1995, Daniel's 
father testified that he and his wife refused to discuss Daniel's 
transition from Gladwyne to Whitemarsh after the appeals panel's 
decision because they believed that Daniel's placement was still 
in dispute at that time.  Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 888 F. 
Supp. 674, 676 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 
0Colonial claims that the Drinkers "have materially 
misrepresented to the Court that the Colonial School District 
discontinued its support for the Gladwyne placement in the Spring 
of 1994," while in fact "the District bore the considerable 
expense of this placement for the entire 1993-1994 school year." 
Reply br. at 2.  Because of our decision to affirm the holding of 
the district court, this factual dispute is at issue in the case 
only in regards to the amount to be reimbursed the Drinkers and 
the Lower Merion School District for bearing the costs of 
Daniel's education at Gladwyne after Colonial's refusal to pay. 
However, we have not been asked, nor do we choose, to address the 
factual issue since we remand the case for decision on that 
matter. 
0We state these facts as the district court found them, see 
Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 888 F. Supp. at 676, since we 
have not been asked to review that court's findings of fact in 
this regard.  On remand, the district court will need to 
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 In June 1994, the parties finally met to discuss 
Daniel's program.  The parents again refused to discuss the 
development of a transition plan and, on August 1, 1994, 
requested another due process hearing.  Dr. Carole Welch 
conducted that hearing in October 1994, at which Daniel's parents 
sought to raise the issue of Daniel's placement. 
 On October 30, 1994, Dr. Welch issued an opinion and 
order that contained two holdings.  First, Dr. Welch found that 
the issue of Daniel's placement was barred by principles of res 
judicata because Daniel's parents had not sought judicial review 
of the March 1994 appeals panel's decision.  Second, because the 
parties could not develop a transition plan, Dr. Welch created a 
plan intended to effect the complete transition of Daniel into 
the Whitemarsh Elementary program by December 1994.  The Drinkers 
appealed Dr. Welch's opinion and order to an administrative 
appeals panel on November 21, 1994, and, two days later, filed 
this action.  On December 28, 1994, the appeals panel affirmed 
Dr. Welch's decision in full.0 
 The Drinkers first appeared before the district court 
on December 2, 1994, seeking a preliminary injunction providing 
that Daniel could remain at Gladwyne at Colonial's expense.  At 
                                                                  
determine the exact amount to be reimbursed the Drinkers for the 
cost of Daniel's education at Gladwyne. 
0Pennsylvania law requires an appeals panel to issue a decision 
within 30 days.  22 Pa. Code § 14.64(o)(3).  In this case, the 
appeals panel issued its decision 37 days after the parents' 
request for review.  The district court concluded that the seven-
day delay appeared to have been harmless and regarded the delay 
as inconsequential.  Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 888 F. Supp. 
at 767 n.9.  The issue has not been raised for review in this 
court. 
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that time, however, the administrative process was incomplete: 
Dr. Welch had issued her decision as an impartial hearing 
officer, but the appeal before the three-judge panel still was 
pending.  Thus, with the parties' consent, the district court 
continued the hearing until after the second appeals panel had 
issued its decision.  After the panel issued the decision, the 
district court held a full hearing on February 3, 1995. 
 On February 3, 1995, the parties agreed to consolidate 
the hearing on the preliminary injunction with a trial on the 
merits, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2).  Following the 
resulting hearing, the district court issued a decision and order 
dated February 13, 1995, affirming in their entirety the 
substantive findings and conclusions of Dr. Welch and the second 
appeals panel.  The court agreed with the hearing officer and 
appeals panel that the issue of whether Colonial could change 
Daniel's placement from Gladwyne to Whitemarsh had been litigated 
before Dr. Redfern and thus could not be relitigated before Dr. 
Welch and the second appeals panel.  Drinker v. Colonial Sch. 
Dist., 888 F. Supp. at 680.  The court's reasoning in support of 
this conclusion differed from that of Dr. Welch and the second 
appeals panel, however.  Rather than relying on the Drinkers' 
failure to appeal the decision of the first appeals panel to the 
district court to conclude that litigation of the placement issue 
was barred by res judicata, as had Dr. Welch and the second 
appeals panel, the district court found that the Drinkers were 
barred from litigating the issue further by their failure to 
9 
raise the issue beyond the hearing officer in the first 
proceeding.  Id. 
 Further, the district court concluded that the "stay 
put" provision in section 1415(e)(3) of the IDEA required 
Colonial to maintain and support Daniel's continued placement at 
Gladwyne pending the outcome of the second due process hearing 
and the subsequent appeals to the administrative appeals panel 
and the district court.  Thus, the court ordered Colonial to pay 
Daniel's expenses at Gladwyne through the date of its order. 
Finally, the court denied the Drinkers' claim under 42 U.S.C. 
§1983, finding that, standing alone, Colonial's violation of 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3)'s stay put requirement did not rise to the 
level of a section 1983 claim, nor had the Drinkers carried their 
burden in proving that Colonial violated their constitutional 
rights.  Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 888 F. Supp. at 681 
n.14.  Colonial appeals only the district court's ruling 
concerning section 1415(e)(3) of the IDEA.  The Drinkers have not 
filed a cross-appeal. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Section 1415(e)(3) of the IDEA 
 The IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-85, gives parents the right 
to an impartial due process hearing on complaints regarding the 
educational placement of their handicapped children, id. 
§1415(b)(2), and to state or federal judicial review of final 
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administrative decisions, id. § 1415(e)(2).0  During these 
administrative and judicial proceedings, section 1415(e)(3) of 
the Act, known as the "stay put" rule, W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 
484, 500 (3d Cir. 1995), applies: 
During the pendency of any proceedings 
conducted pursuant to this section, unless 
the State or local educational agency and the 
parents or guardian otherwise agree, the 
child shall remain in the then current 
educational placement of such child, or, if 
applying for initial admission to a public 
school, shall, with the consent of the 
parents or guardian, be placed in the public 
school program until all such proceedings 
have been completed. 
                     
0Section 1415(e)(2) of the IDEA provides in relevant part: 
 
Any party aggrieved by the findings and 
decision made under subsection . . . shall 
have the right to bring a civil action with 
respect to the complaint presented pursuant 
to this section, which action may be brought 
in any State court of competent jurisdiction 
or in a district court of the United States 
without regard to the amount in controversy. 
In any action brought under this paragraph 
the court shall receive the records of the 
administrative proceedings, shall hear 
additional evidence at the request of a 
party, and, basing its decision on the 
preponderance of the evidence, shall grant 
such relief as the court determines is 
appropriate. 
 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). 
 
 Pennsylvania has adopted a "two-tier" special education 
administrative hearing system that consists of an evidentiary 
hearing at the "local" level before a single impartial hearing 
officer and then an independent review at the "state" level 
before a panel of three impartial appellate officers.  See 22 Pa. 
Code § 14.64(m).  This system conforms with the requirements of 
sections 1415(b)(2) and (c) of the IDEA.  See 20 U.S.C. 
§§1415(b)(2), (c). 
11 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a).0 
 The Supreme Court has described the language of section 
1415(e)(3) as "unequivocal," in that it states plainly that "`the 
child shall remain in the then current educational placement.'" 
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323, 108 S.Ct. 592, 604 (1988).  In 
describing the section's purpose, the Court noted that it seems 
clear that "Congress very much meant to strip schools of the 
unilateral authority they had traditionally employed to exclude 
disabled students, particularly emotionally disturbed students, 
from school."  Id. at 323, 108 S.Ct. at 604; see also School 
Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 373, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 
2004 (1985) ("We think at least one purpose of § 1415(e)(3) was 
to prevent school officials from removing a child from the 
                     
0The educational agency and contesting parents may agree to a 
change in placement under section 1415(e)(3).  Federal 
regulations under the statute thus provide as follows: 
 
During the pendency of any administrative or 
judicial proceeding regarding a complaint, 
unless the public agency and the parents of 
the child agree otherwise, the child involved 
in the complaint must remain in his or her 
present educational placement. 
 
34 C.F.R. § 300.513.  The due process requirements of the 
Pennsylvania regulations implementing the IDEA track this federal 
standard: 
 
No change in the identification, evaluation, 
educational placement or IEP of an 
exceptional student or an eligible young 
child may be made during the pendency of an 
administrative or judicial proceeding unless 
agreed to by the parties to the proceeding. 
 
22 Pa. Code § 14.61(b). 
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regular public school classroom over the parents' objection 
pending completion of the review proceedings."). 
 Section 1415(e)(3) of the IDEA functions, in essence, 
as an automatic preliminary injunction.  Zvi D. v. Ambach, 694 
F.2d 904, 906 (2d Cir. 1982).  As the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit has stated, "[t]he statute substitutes an absolute 
rule in favor of the status quo for the court's discretionary 
consideration of the factors of irreparable harm and either a 
likelihood of success on the merits or a fair ground for 
litigation and a balance of hardships."  Id. (citations omitted); 
see also Woods v. New Jersey Dep't of Educ., No. 93-5123, 20 
Indiv. Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. (LRP Publications) 439, 440 (3d 
Cir. Sept. 17, 1993).0  As we have stated: 
The provision represents Congress' policy 
choice that all handicapped children, 
regardless of whether their case is 
meritorious or not, are to remain in their 
current educational placement until the 
dispute with regard to their placement is 
ultimately resolved.  Once a court ascertains 
the student's current educational placement, 
the movants are entitled to an order without 
satisfaction of the usual prerequisites to 
injunctive relief. 
Woods, 20 Indiv. Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. (LRP Publications) at 
440.  The relevant inquiry under section 1415(e)(3) thus becomes 
the identification of "the then current educational placement,"0 
                     
0As appellants correctly note, our decision in Woods is 
unpublished, and thus is not regarded as binding authority.  See 
Internal Operating Procedure 5.8 (1994).  However, because of the 
case's factual similarity to that before us, we look to the 
decision as a paradigm of the legal analysis we should here 
follow. 
0Neither the statute nor the legislative history provides 
guidance for a reviewing court on how to identify "the then 
13 
of the handicapped student and, further, the identification of 
who should pay for it.  See Woods, 20 Indiv. Disabilities Educ. 
L. Rep. (LRP Publications) at 440; Zvi D., 694 F.2d at 906.  As 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained in Zvi D.: 
[I]mplicit in the maintenance of the status 
quo is the requirement that a school district 
continue to finance an educational placement 
made by the agency and consented to by the 
parent before the parent requested a due 
process hearing.  To cut off public funds 
would amount to a unilateral change in 
placement, prohibited by the Act. 
Id. at 906 (citing Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F. Supp. 1074, 1089 
(D. Neb. 1980), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 
645 F.2d 592, 597-98 (8th Cir. 1981)). 
 In addressing Colonial's appeal, then, we must decide 
if Gladwyne indeed qualified as Daniel's "then current 
educational placement" during the pendency of the parents' second 
round of hearing officer and appeals panel review and until the 
time that the district court ruled.0  Our review of this legal 
issue is plenary.  See Woods, 20 Indiv. Disabilities Educ. L. 
Rep. (LRP Publications) at 440; Leonard v. McKenzie, 869 F.2d 
1558, 1564 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 
B.  "During the pendency of any proceeding . . . ."  
 Colonial's argument is several-fold.  First, Colonial 
interprets Pennsylvania's two-tier system of administrative 
                                                                  
current educational placement."  Zvi D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d at 
906 n.5; see also Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 918 F.2d 
618, 625 (6th Cir. 1990). 
0The Drinkers have not asserted that the "stay put" provision 
extended beyond that date. 
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review as providing for "finality" of decision at the "local" 
level of impartial hearing officer review to the extent that such 
a decision is not appealed to the state level.  See br. at 10-11 
(citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) and (e)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.509). 
Decisions made at the state level, according to the school 
district, are final to the extent that they are not appealed for 
judicial review.  Id. at 11 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(1); 34 
C.F.R. § 300.510(d)). 
 Colonial next quotes from our decision in Woods, as 
follows: 
[T]he purpose of the `stay put' is to 
preserve the status quo of the child's 
functioning placement and program until the 
underlying IDEA litigation is resolved, 
unless there is an effective waiver of the 
protection of the `stay put' (emphasis 
added). 
Br. at 11 (citing Woods, 20 Indiv. Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. 
(LRP Publications) at 440).  Colonial then seeks to apply this 
statement from Woods to the situation of Daniel Drinker, 
concluding that: 
In the present case, the `underlying IDEA 
litigation' concerning the central issue of 
whether Daniel should be placed at Whitemarsh 
Elementary or remain at Gladwyne Elementary 
was unquestionably `resolved' when the 
parents failed to challenge Dr. Redfern's 
ruling on that issue before the first appeals 
panel.  On this point both the second appeals 
panel and the [district] court completely 
agree, and their independent conclusions are 
not in question before this Court on appeal. 
. . . [T]he decision to place Daniel at 
Whitemarsh Elementary School by the beginning 
of the 1994-1995 school year was resolved 
beyond the point of either collateral attack 
in further administrative proceedings or 
direct attack in judicial appeal. 
15 
Br. at 11-12.  Thus, Colonial essentially argues that because Dr. 
Redfern decided that it could change Daniel's educational 
placement from Gladwyne to Whitemarsh, which decision the 
Drinkers did not appeal to the state administrative panel, Dr. 
Redfern's decision became a final resolution of the "underlying 
IDEA litigation," rendering section 1415(e)(3)'s stay put 
requirement to keep Daniel at Gladwyne satisfied as of April 25, 
1994. 
 In making this argument, Colonial relies on the 
elements of the district court's decision holding that the 
Drinkers were barred from litigating the placement issue once 
they failed to appeal Dr. Redfern's decision to the state 
administrative panel.  Specifically, Colonial cites the district 
court's conclusion that the issue of Daniel's placement, which 
they claim to be the crux of the "underlying IDEA litigation," 
was "resolved beyond the point of either collateral attack in 
further administrative proceedings or direct attack in judicial 
appeal" because the issue was not appealed to the first state 
appeals panel.  Br. at 12.  Therefore, Colonial argues that since 
the "underlying IDEA litigation" was thus settled, section 
1415(e)(3)'s mandate to maintain the "then current educational 
placement" of Daniel at Gladwyne Elementary was settled at the 
point of the first appeals panel's decision. 
 We will assume without deciding that the district court 
properly concluded that the underlying placement dispute was 
resolved when the Drinkers did not appeal Dr. Redfern's decision. 
Nevertheless, Colonial's conclusion that the court's application 
16 
of the stay put provision of section 1415(e)(3) was inappropriate 
does not follow.  Colonial makes the conceptual mistake of 
separately cabining the issues of placement and transition, 
concepts that cannot be so radically separated.0  While it is 
true that the Drinkers acquiesced in Dr. Redfern's placement 
decision, that decision included, as part and parcel of the plan, 
a nearly-one-year transition program for Daniel.  In contrast, 
the appeals decision of March 1994 aimed to place Daniel at 
Whitemarsh by April 24, 1994, with barely a three-week transition 
period.  Transition periods and timing of placement are integral 
elements of any educational program, elements that were not 
settled by any stretch of the imagination even were we to address 
Colonial's claim that the bare fact of placement at Whitemarsh 
had been decided as of March 17, 1994.  Thus, Dr. Redfern's 
placement decision, though settling the issue of where Daniel 
ultimately would be placed, had not settled the timing and 
transition issues, since those elements were contested hotly 
through the time of the February 13, 1995 decision of the 
                     
0Appellees stated the situation well in their brief: 
 
By defining the underlying litigation as only 
the placement issue, i.e. Gladwyne or 
Whitemarsh, Appellants ignore the important 
issues the parents consistently contested 
that were integrally related to the 
appropriate educational placement of Daniel. 
Those issues included the nature and length 
of transition (which Appellants resisted), an 
appropriate IEP (which appellants resisted), 
and payment for the appropriate program 
(Gladwyne). 
 
Br. at 12 (footnote omitted). 
17 
district court.  Consequently, Colonial's claim that section 
1415(e)(3)'s mandate to maintain the Gladwyne placement could not 
apply past the first appeals panel's decision is not an accurate 
statement of the section's application. 
 Colonial's reliance on Letter to Spindler, OSEP Policy 
Letter, Apr. 21, 1992, reprinted in 18 Indiv. Disabilities Educ. 
L. Rep. (LRP Publications) 1038, 1039 (1992), does not change our 
conclusion.  Colonial contends that this letter from the Office 
of Special Education Programs of the U.S. Department of Education 
to an educator in Montana plainly holds that "the pendent 
placement in which a student must `stay put' is the one upheld by 
a final, unappealed order, regardless of whether continued 
program disputes and due process hearings concerning that 
placement are likely."  Br. at 13.  However, the facts at issue 
in Letter to Spindler concerned an unappealed district court 
order regarding educational placement.  The letter simply states 
that, for stay put purposes, an unappealed district court order 
is a final order.  In contrast, here Colonial's claimed "final" 
order was that of an impartial hearing officer, unexamined by 
either state administrative or judicial review, and the program 
disputes at issue were not the mechanics of an IEP, as in Letter 
to Spindler, but the all-important issues of timing and 
transition to a new educational placement -- the issues at the 
core of section 1415(e)(3)'s concerns.  Thus, we find Letter to 
Spindler unpersuasive in regards to our holding that the 
"underlying IDEA litigation" concerning Daniel Drinker's 
education was not resolved at the time of the first appeals 
18 
panel's decision.  Woods, 20 Indiv. Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. 
(LRP Publications) at 440.  Because the litigation was not 
resolved, section 1415(e)(3)'s requirement that "during the 
pendency of any proceedings . . . the child shall remain in the 
then current educational placement" applied to the case of Daniel 
Drinker beyond the first appeals panel decision. 
 
C.  Daniel Drinker's "then current educational placement" 
 As the Drinkers note, there is no question that 
Gladwyne was the current placement of Daniel Drinker at the time 
Colonial issued the NORA to them in July 1993.  Br. at 11.  The 
IEP team, consistent with the requirements of the IDEA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1414(a)(5), and Pennsylvania Regulations, 22 Pa. Code 
§§14.42(b), (c), and 14.32, had determined the appropriate 
placement and location of services for Daniel to be Gladwyne 
Elementary in October 1992.  In the fall of 1993, there was no 
other valid IEP in place.  Thus, there was no other current 
educational placement at that time.  As the Court of Appeals for 
the 6th Circuit has stated: 
Because the term connotes preservation of the 
status quo, it refers to the operative 
placement actually functioning at the time 
the dispute first arises.  If an IEP has been 
implemented, then that program's placement 
will be the one subject to the stayput 
provision.  And where . . . the dispute 
arises before any IEP has been implemented, 
the `current educational placement' will be 
the operative placement under which the child 
is actually receiving instruction at the time 
the dispute arises. 
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Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 918 F.2d 618, 625-26 (6th Cir. 
1990). 
 The standard in our cases has been the same.  As we 
noted in Woods, "the dispositive factor in deciding a child's 
`current educational placement' should be the Individualized 
Education Program ("IEP") . . . actually functioning when the 
`stay put' is invoked."  Id., 20 Indiv. Disabilities Educ. L. 
Rep. (LRP Publications) at 440. 
 As the operative placement actually functioning at the 
time the dispute between the Drinkers and Colonial arose (the IEP 
actually functioning when the stay put provision of the IDEA was 
invoked) was Daniel's placement at Gladwyne Elementary, the 
district court was correct in its decision that Colonial must 
bear the burden of paying for the costs of Daniel's education at 
Gladwyne through the date of the district court's final order. 
See School Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. at 372-74, 105 
S.Ct. at 2004-05. 
 
D.  Waiver 
 Colonial's second line of attack on the district 
court's holding is that the Gladwyne Elementary School could not 
have remained Daniel's "then current educational placement" 
because of the effective waiver of the protection of the "stay 
put" provision by Daniel's parents.  Colonial claims that: 
Dr. Welch, the second appeals panel, and the 
District Court below appear to be united in 
their conclusion that the failure of the 
parents to appeal Dr. Redfern's order to the 
first appeals panel effectively and 
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conclusively resolved the underlying 
placement dispute in favor of Colonial's 
Whitemarsh Elementary proposal.  The District 
Court also concluded, in an analysis that 
specifically addressed its ability to 
consider the placement issue as if on direct 
appeal from the first panel's decision, that 
the parents had effectively waived the right 
to litigate further the appropriateness of 
the placement at Whitemarsh by failing to 
present the issue to the first panel. 
Br. at 15. 
 However, even were we to accept the argument that the 
Drinkers were estopped from raising the placement issue for 
either administrative or judicial review once they failed to 
bring the matter to the attention of the first appeals panel, 
section 1415(e)(3)'s stay put mandate would apply to Daniel's 
situation because the transition elements of his program still 
were being contested hotly by the parties through the time of the 
district court's review.  As the Drinkers note in their brief, 
[a]dministrative decisions . . . that may be 
interpreted as inconsistent with the lower 
court's finding that Gladwyne was Daniel 
Drinker's current placement `cannot 
metamorphize [sic] the procedural record or 
alter facts' that the Drinkers were 
continuing to resist Colonial's vigorous 
efforts to move Daniel as quickly as possible 
from Gladwyne and impose the costs of 
continued placement at Gladwyne on the 
Drinkers. 
Br. at 13 (citing Woods, 20 Indiv. Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. 
(LRP Publications) at 440). 
 Moreover, to the extent that appellants argue that the 
Drinkers "effectively" waived the protection of the stay put 
provision, the Drinkers are correct in noting that nothing in 
Woods or any other case that we have found interprets the stay 
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put provision as suggesting that parents can lose their stay put 
protection except by affirmative agreement to give it up.  See 
Br. at 13 (citing Woods, 20 Indiv. Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. 
(LRP Publications) at 440.)  In any event, even assuming that in 
a proper case the stay put provision can be waived, we find 
nothing in the record here that leads us to believe that this is 
such a case.  Consequently, inasmuch as there was no explicit 
agreement by the Drinkers and Colonial that Gladwyne would not be 
Daniel's "current educational placement" for purposes of the stay 
put provision, the Drinkers did not waive that protection.  See 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513; 22 Pa. Code 
§14.61(b). 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 For all the reasons detailed above, we will affirm the 
district court's order of February 13, 1995, granting the 
Drinkers' motion for a preliminary injunction in part and 
entering judgment in favor of the Drinkers on Count II of their 
complaint.  Accordingly, we will remand the case to the district 
court for the entry of orders requiring Colonial to reimburse all 
costs billed to the Drinkers for Daniel's education at Gladwyne 
and to pay all further costs owed to the Lower Merion school 
district for Daniel's education through February 13, 1995, the 
date of the district court's final order.0  In accordance with 
                     
0The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held 
in Andersen v. District of Columbia, 877 F.2d 1018, 1023 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989), that maintenance of a child's "then current 
educational placement" under section 1415(e)(3) is required only 
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the district court's order of September 20, 1995, the Drinkers 
are entitled to renew their motion for attorneys' fees to that 
court within 14 days of the issuance of our judgment.  Thus, we 
need not address that issue here. 
           
 
 
 
 
                                                                  
through the level of district court review.  That is, maintenance 
of the placement is not required during the process of appeal to 
the courts of appeal or the Supreme Court.  Id.  To our 
knowledge, that court is the only court of appeals to have 
addressed this issue.  Without deciding the matter, we affirm the 
district court's decision to require Colonial to "bear the burden 
of paying for the costs of Daniel's education at Gladwyne through 
[the district court's] review."  Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 
888 F. Supp. at 681. 
